Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed many grave weaknesses in the international order. One noticeable flaw that needs addressing concerns the United Nations Security Council and its role in overseeing the multilateral system. Specifically, and underscoring a point we highlighted in our essay in a recent Brookings Institution report, the war in Ukraine has once again shown the veto strength of the Security Council’s five long-lasting members to be a major stumbling block to peace.
Chapter I, Article 1 of the U.N. Charter, which was drafted following the devastation of World War II, states that the U.N.’s first purpose is to continue international peace and security. To that end, the organization aims to prevent threats to peace, suppress acts of aggression, and bring about peaceful settlement of international disputes. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter entrust this chief mission to the Security Council.
But the absolute veto strength granted by Article 27 to each of the Council’s long-lasting members (the P5, comprising China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has from the beginning been a meaningful obstacle to the body’s fulfillment of its mission. That is because the P5 have almost always been divided into competitor geopolitical blocs, with a member of one bloc—mostly either the Soviet Union (and now its heir, Russia) or the U.S.—exercising its veto on many crucial decisions.
The war in Ukraine has once again shown the veto strength of the Security Council’s five long-lasting members to be a major stumbling block to peace.
Russia’s savage blitz on Ukraine is a stark reminder of the Security Council’s impotence when the interests of one or more of the P5 conflict with those of the other members. After WWII, optimists hoped that a threat to security would rule the Security Council initially to impose comprehensive binding economic sanctions in order to deter aggression and encourage peaceful conflict resolution.
But in the current Ukraine conflict, Russia’s Security Council veto method that the U.S. and its allies can impose sanctions only by a “coalition of the willing.” True, the large number of countries and the extraterritorial reach of the dollar-based payments system gives U.S.-imposed sanctions tremendous clout. in addition, in this case as in others, a Security Council-enforced system of global sanctions would be already more weakening to the sanctioned economy.
additionally, the emerging role of digital money and changes in the international monetary system that it might bring about could soon diminish the dollar’s role and reduce what a U.S.-led coalition of the willing can unprotected to. And in other situations, such as former U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2018 decision to reimpose harsh economic sanctions against Iran, the dollar’s extraterritorial reach has generated important resentment already among U.S. allies.
Finally, while much of the world is currently rallying around the U.S.-led coalition of democracies in the confront of blatant Russian aggression against Ukraine, unfortunately we cannot rule out the possibility that a future Trump or Trump-like administration in the U.S. does something that could potentially make its Security Council veto a problem for much of the democratic world.
The fact that an increasingly illegitimate and ineffective Security Council lies at the heart of today’s multilateral system is all the more unfortunate given the growing range of threats to peace and security. These include not only traditional acts of aggression of the sort the world is witnessing in Ukraine—and which could in addition escalate to nuclear exchanges—but also other security threats posed by new technologies.
For example, state or non-state actors could cause havoc by devastating cyberattacks or the abuse of artificial intelligence. Synthetic viruses already more deadly than the coronavirus that caused COVID-19 could inflict unspeakable harm, whether by bioterror or bio-error. And climate change is a threat to all of humanity that must be on a reformed Security Council’s radar screen. Tight and without exception binding regulations are urgently needed in all of these domains.
We consequently advocate radically changing the way the Security Council operates, by introducing the possibility of overturning a long-lasting member’s veto. This could be done by adding a clause to Article 27 that would allow a large double majority—representing, for example, at the minimum two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population—to override a veto.
Our proposal would be vetoed today by Russia and probably China—and perhaps also by the three democracies among the P5, including the U.S. But a large majority of countries would likely sustain it. In fact, this is an ideal time for the world’s democracies, including the U.S., to propose such a change. By backing it, President Joe Biden’s administration could seize the moment and show its determination to create a more equitable and inclusive multilateral system. This would send a powerful—and widely welcomed—message that the U.S. is confident that its enlightened national self-interest will be in accord with the interests of a large majority of the world’s countries and people.
At first, such a proposal would be doubtful to get sufficient backing in the U.S. Congress. But every crisis contains an opportunity. A scheme as outlined above could stimulus sustain for reform in the U.S. and other democracies among all who are concerned about old and new threats to human security.
With peace increasingly at risk, the Security Council could play a much greater role in mitigating dangers. Let us hope that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine triggers a extreme change that makes the body more authentic and effective.